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INTRODUCTION 
Imagine a nice restaurant in a flourishing commercial area of your 
city. A few years ago, the owner of this restaurant obtained financing from a 
commercial mortgage lender to open the restaurant. 1 The restaurant, like the 
part of town where it is located, is thriving. During the economic downturn 
faced by the majority of the United States,2 the neighborhood where the 
restaurant is located fared better than many other parts of the country. 3 In 
this area, people are still eating out regularly, visiting the nearby high-end 
mall, and spending money freely. There is no indication that this area is 
experiencing as severe of a downturn as most of the rest of the country is 
experiencing. Because of the restaurant's success, the owner has had no 
trouble making his regular required loan payments to the lender. The owner 
also always ensures that his payments are on time. 4 Since opening in 2005, 
the owner has not made any substantial changes to the property, and there 
has been no deterioration beyond normal wear and tear.5 
The structure of the commercial mortgage provides the lender with a 
second avenue of collection.6 If the owner fails to make a loan payment, 
I. See generally CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, ]]] TH CONG., FEB. OVERSIGHT REP., 
COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE LOSSES AND THE RISK TO FINANCIAL STABILITY 13 (2010), avail-
able at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CPRT-IIIJPRT54785/pdf/CPRT-IIIJPRT54785.pdf 
(explaining how commercial mortgages act as financing for businesses). Throughout the rest 
of this Note, commercial mortgage will refer to a recourse commercial mortgage loan, and 
lender will refer to a commercial mortgage lender. A recourse loan is "[a] loan that allows 
the lender, if the borrower defaults, not only to attach the collateral but also to seek judgment 
against the borrower's (or guarantor's) personal assets." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1021 
(9th ed. 2009). 
2. See generally Markus K. Brunnerrneier, Deciphering the Liquidity and Credit 
Crunch 2007-2008, 23 J. EcoN. PERSP. 77,77-78 (2009) (explaining how the downturn began 
in 2007). 
3. See, e.g., John Collins Rudolf, Phoenix Meets the Wrong End of the Boom Cy-
cle, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 2010, at B6, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/17/ 
reales-
tate/commercial/ I 7phoenix.html?pagewanted= 1 & _r= 3&sq=commercial%20foreclosure&st= 
cse&scp=IO ("Desirable pockets in affluent cities like Scottsdale have little vacant space 
available at any price, while areas close to the downtown core and along established urban 
corridors are weathering the storm fairly well."). 
4. A loan payment is considered timely when it is made on or before the due date. 
5. As defined by Black's Law Dictionary, wear and tear means "[d]eterioration 
caused by ordinary use." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note I, at 1731. 
6. A lender is "[a] person or entity from which something (esp. money) is bor-
rowed." !d. at 985. A secured creditor is "[a] creditor who has the right, on the debtor's de-
fault, to proceed against collateral and apply it to the payment of the debt." !d. at 425. By 
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then the lender can foreclose on the restaurant and sell it to collect the mon-
ey it is due.7 This commercial mortgage also contains a standard insecurity 
clause. 8 An insecurity clause allows the lender to demand payment or to 
foreclose if the lender feels insecure about receiving repayment from the 
borrower.9 Despite the success of the neighborhood and the restaurant, the 
lender who fmanced the owner's loan decided to have the restaurant reap-
praised.10 The lender hired an appraiser to determine the restaurant's current 
value. 11 The appraiser looked at comparable properties in the area and eval-
uated possible sale prices for the property. 12 Determining an accurate value 
for the restaurant is challenging because there have not been many sales in 
the area due to the economic downturn, and the properties that have sold 
were generally distressed sales. 13 The appraiser found that the restaurant's 
appraised value had significantly decreased from the property's appraised 
value at the origination of the loan. 
The owner has been making payments towards the loan for a number 
of years, so only about half of the total loan is still outstanding. The proper-
ty's appraised value, although less than the original appraised value, is still 
higher than the outstanding balance due on the loan. Given these circum-
stances, the lender determined that it is insecure about being made whole. 
The lender informed the owner that he must pay the outstanding balance of 
the loan in full now, even though the original maturity date provided in the 
note is several years away. 14 The owner will probably not be able to come 
contracting for a second avenue of collection, the lender becomes a secured creditor. A se-
cured loan is "[a] loan that is secured by property or securities." !d. at I 021. 
7. A commercial mortgage is "[a] mortgage loan written for a business purpose 
with a building used as collateral." Small Business Glossary of Terms, TD BANK, 
http://www.tdbank.com/bank/glossary_sb.html (last visited Apr. 19, 2012). A foreclosure is 
"[a] legal proceeding to terminate a mortgagor's interest in property, instituted by the lender 
(the mortgagee) either to gain title or to force a sale in order to satisfy the unpaid debt se-
cured by the property." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 1, at 719. 
8. As defined in Black's Law Dictionary, an insecurity clause is "[a] loan-
agreement provision that allows the creditor to demand immediate and full payment of the 
loan balance if the creditor has reason to believe that the debtor is about to default." BLACK's 
LAW DICTIONARY, supra note I, at 866. For the purpose of this Article, an insecurity clause 
is a type of acceleration clause. 
9. !d. 
I 0. An appraisal is "[t]he determination of what constitutes a fair price" and "[t]he 
report of such a determination." !d. at 117. 
II. An appraiser is "[a]n impartial person who estimates the value of something, 
such as real estate." !d. 
12. See generally The Real Estate Appraisal Process, SHENEHON Co., 
http://www .shenehon.com/index.cfrnlthe _real_ estate_ appraisal_process/40 (last visited Apr. 
19, 20 12) (explaining different approaches to valuation). 
13. See Eric Billingsley, Brokers, Lenders, Appraisers Spar over Property Values, 
SAN FERN. V. Bus. J., Feb. 1, 2010, at 4, available at http://www.sfvbj.com/news/2010/ 
jan/31/brokers-lenders-appraisers-spar-over-property-valu/. 
14. See supra note 8. 
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up with the full outstanding balance of the loan at this time. If he cannot 
pay, then the lender will foreclose on the property. 15 The lender is contrac-
tually able to do this because of the insecurity clause in the loan agree-
ment.16 However, the owner is making his payments on the loan, and the 
property's appraised value is greater than the value of the loan outstanding. 
Therefore, the issue is whether the lender is actually insecure. In this type of 
situation, the courts should protect borrowers from lenders' abuse of such 
clauses by requiring good faith in application of an insecurity clause and not 
allowing the lender to call the loan or foreclose on the secured property 
based on insecurity. 17 If the borrower has not violated any material cove-
nants of the loan and the appraised value of the collateral is greater than the 
outstanding balance on the loan, then absent other evidence, the court 
should hold that a lender breached an implied duty of good faith in its use of 
the insecurity clause. 18 
This Note proposes a standard for courts to use when evaluating 
whether lenders have breached an implied duty to act in good faith when 
using an insecurity clause. Part I of this Note explains the role of good faith 
and insecurity clauses in the commercial mortgage industry and outlines the 
current environment of commercial mortgage lending. Part II focuses on the 
national approach and the varying state approaches that courts have taken 
when faced with the issue of good faith and acceleration clauses. Part III 
proposes a uniform standard by which courts can evaluate the actions of 
lenders that deem themselves insecure despite no contractual breach by the 
borrower and an appraised value that is greater than the outstanding balance 
due on the loan. 
I. CURRENT STATE OF COMMERCIAL MORTGAGE LENDING 
Since December 2007, the United States has been experiencing an 
economic downturn. 19 This downturn affected the value of commercial real 
estate properties around the country, causing most of them to decrease sig-
nificantly in value.20 In response to the recession, many lenders have chosen 
15. See supra note 6. 
16. The insecurity clause allows the lender to demand payment in full when it feels 
insecure. See supra note 8. This type of loan allows the lender to get that payment through 
foreclosing on the property, if needed. See supra note 6. 
17. To call is "[t]o demand payment of money." BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY, supra 
note l, at 232. 
18. See discussion infra Part Ill. 
19. NAT'L BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH, DETERMINATION OF THE DECEMBER 2007 
PEAK IN ECONOMIC ACTIVITY l (2008), available at http://www.nber.org/dec2008.pdf [here-
inafter ECONOMIC ACTIVITY). 
20. Carrick Mollenkamp & Lingling Wei, To Fix Sour Property Deals, Lenders 
'Extend and Pretend,' WALL ST. J., July 7, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SBlOOOI 
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to change the terms of their commercial mortgages or to extend them, rather 
than foreclosing on their properties.21 Other lenders have chosen to foreclose 
based on insecurity, which in tum will increase their liquidity.22 How lend-
ers have responded to the decline has had a substantial effect on borrowers. 
Commercial mortgages are a common mode of providing capital to 
businesses. 23 Lenders use these mortgages because they provide a second 
· avenue of collection if a borrower defaults.24 If the borrower defaults, the 
lender can foreclose on the secured property and sell it to recoup the re-
mainder of the loan. 25 These loans typically have a lower interest rate and a 
low level of default risk because borrowers do not want to lose their proper-
ty.26 Despite the low level of default risk, lenders may still want more pro-
tection from default, so they include an insecurity clause in the loan agree-
ment. 27 This clause allows a lender to request full payment before the date 
of maturity if the lender feels insecure about receiving full repayment of the 
loan.28 
A. The Use oflnsecurity Clauses in Commercial Mortgage Lending 
In commercial mortgage lending, a borrower contracts with a lender 
for a loan to fund its business.29 The lender protects itself by making the 
424052748704764404575286882690834088.html. "U.S. commercial-real-estate values 
remain 42% below their October 2007 peak." ld. 
21. ld. 
22. Liquidity is "[t]he quality or state of being readily convertible to cash." BLACK's 
LAW DICTIONARY, supra note I, at 1015. 
23. "Commercial mortgages are those that have been secured by property owned or 
occupied by business enterprises .... " Yuliya Demyanyk & Kent Cherny, Bank Exposure to 
Commercial Real Estate, FED. RESERVE BANK OF CLEVELAND (Aug. II, 2009), 
http://www.clevelandfed.org/Research/trends/2009/0809/01 banfin.cfm. "The total volume of 
commercial mortgages held by banks more than tripled in the last decade both nationally and 
in the Fourth District." ld. "Nationally, the volume at commercial banks peaked at approxi-
mately $1.8 trillion last year." ld. 
24. See supra notes 6, 7 and accompanying text. 
25. See supra note 7. 
26. Commercial Property Loans, SMALL Bus. FIN. TiPS, http://www.smallbusiness 
financetips.com/commercial-property-loans.html (last visited Apr. 19, 20 12). 
27. See John Pierre & M.R. Franks, The Consequence of Default to the Debtor Un-
der Part 5, Chapter 9 of the Louisiana Commercial Laws: A Primer on Debtor's Rights, 18 
S. U. L. REv. 21, 22 ( 1991) ("Most security agreements provide the secured party the option 
to accelerate the debt's maturity and to cause all payments to become due and payable im-
mediately when the debtor has defaulted."). 
28. U.C.C. § 1-309 (2004) (stating that an option to accelerate at will is "[a] term 
providing that one party ... may accelerate payment ... when the party 'deems itself inse-
cure,' ... means that the party has power to do so only if that party in good faith believes 
that the prospect of payment or performance is impaired"). 
29. As defined by Black's Law Dictionary, a borrower is "[a] person or entity to 
whom money or something else is lent." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note I, at 209. A 
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borrower's property available as another means of collection if the borrower 
fails to pay.30 The borrower's obligation is to make regular payments on the 
loan.31 If the borrower misses a payment, the lender can collect on only the 
missed payment pursuant to the terms of the loan agreement.32 To protect 
lenders against this delay in collection, most commercial mortgages include 
an acceleration clause in the agreement.33 An acceleration clause allows the 
lender to sue for the total outstanding balance due as soon as the borrower 
misses the first payment or defaults in another way.34 With an acceleration 
clause in the agreement, the lender can call the loan or foreclose on the 
property if the borrower stops making payments or defaults in some other 
manner that is outlined in the commercial mortgage.35 
A variation of the acceleration clause is an insecurity clause. 36 Insecu-
rity clauses are often tied to the value of the property that the borrower used 
to secure its loan.37 If the value of the property decreases, the lender may no 
longer consider the property a sufficient "secondary source of repayment" 
and could request repayment of the entire loan.38 Technically, the lender can 
request this repayment any time that it feels insecure about being made 
whole, even if the borrower has been making timely, regular payments.39 
Although the purpose of an insecurity clause is to protect the lender from 
nonpayment, there should be some limitations to the depth of that protec-
tion.40 If a borrower is regularly making payments and shows no other indi-
cation of being unable to repay the loan in the future, then the lender should 
not penalize the borrower for situations where there is an overall decline in 
the market.41 The concern is whether the institution is actually insecure un-
loan is "[a ]n act of lending; a grant of something for temporary use." /d. at I 0 19; see supra 
note I. 
30. See supra notes 6, 7 and accompanying text. 
31. See generally Wilcox v. Ex'rs of Plummer, 29 U.S. 172, 179 (1830) ("If one 
borrows money, it is his duty to pay .... "). 
32. See generally 10 C.J.S. Bills and Notes§ 126 (2012). 
33. An acceleration clause is "[a] loan-agreement provision that requires the debtor 
to pay off the balance sooner than the due date if some specified event occurs, such as failure 
to pay an installment or to maintain insurance." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note I, at 
12-13. 
34. See id. 
35. See id. 
36. An insecurity clause is a type of acceleration clause. Pierre & Franks, supra note 
27, at 22. 
3 7. See supra note 6. 
38. Emily Maltby, Collateral Damage in Lending: With Assets Harder to Value, 
More Small Businesses Need Cash to Get a Loan, WALL ST. J., July 22, 2010, 
http://online. wsj .com/article/SB I 000 1424052748703 79270457 53669924903391 02.htmi?KE 
YWORDS=Collaterai+Damage+in+Lending. 
39. See supra note 8. 
40. See discussion infra Part III. 
41. See discussion infra Section III.B. 
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der these circumstances or whether it is abusing its use of the insecurity 
clause.42 
An insecurity clause allows a lender to request payment in full when-
ever the lender '"deems itself insecure. "'43 The lender cannot arbitrarily 
decide that it feels insecure, but it does have some discretion over this deci-
sion. However, courts should choose to limit this discretion by an obligation 
to act in "good faith."44 It is possible that the value of the collateral could 
decrease but that the lender could still feel confident that it will receive 
payment from the lender.45 This decrease may happen, for example, when 
an overall market has declined, but the business supported by the commer-
cial mortgage is still running successfully.46 While the results are sometimes 
harsh, an acceleration clause triggered by nonpayment is generally accept-
ed.47 On the other hand, if other events trigger an insecurity clause, such as a 
large overall market downturn, and the borrower has not defaulted, then 
there should be some regulation to limit the lender's ability to use the inse-
curity clause.48 
Insecurity clauses are frequently used in commercial mortgage lending 
to protect the lender from situations where it seems that the borrower will be 
unable to repay the loan, but nothing in the loan agreement has been ex-
pressly violated.49 These clauses allow a lender to accelerate the obligation 
of the borrower to repay the lender. 5° Because these clauses can force a bor-
rower to default, even if the borrower has been making his payments, there 
should be some regulation of their use.51 Specifically, there should be a way 
to determine whether a lender is actually insecure before it uses an insecuri-
ty clause. For commercial lending pertaining to personal property, the Uni-
form Commercial Code (U.C.C.) establishes a standard that the lender must 
meet before an insecurity clause can be implemented, which includes a re-
42. See discussion infra Section III.B. 
43. u.c.c. § 1-309 (2004). 
44. !d. "Every contract or duty within [the Uniform Commercial Code] imposes an 
obligation of good faith in its performance and enforcement." !d. § 1-304. Good faith means 
"[a] state of mind consisting in (I) honesty in belief or purpose, (2) faithfulness to one's duty 
or obligation, (3) observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in a given 
trade or business, or (4) absence of intent to defraud or to seek unconscionable advantage." 
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note I, at 762. 
45. Collateral is "[p]roperty that is pledged as security against a debt." BLACK'S 
LAW DICTIONARY, supra note I, at 297. 
46. Please see discussion of the example provided in the Introduction of this Note. 
47. See supra note 33. 
48. See discussion infra Section Ill. B. 
49. See supra note 8. 
50. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: MORTGAGES§ 8.1 cmt. a (1997). 
51. See discussion infra Part III. 
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quirement to act in good faith. 52 The U.C.C. does not consider a commercial 
mortgage to be a secured transaction.53 Therefore, no uniform code exists to 
address the use of insecurity clauses in commercial mortgage lending. 
Under common law, the courts determined that acceleration clauses 
are not a penalty and are allowed in secured transactions, but they estab-
lished limitations on these clauses.54 One way in which an acceleration 
clause would not be enforced is if the lender acted in bad faith or the clause 
was unconscionable. 55 The purpose of an acceleration clause is to reduce the 
lender's risk of nonpayment by the borrower.56 The acceleration clause al-
lows a lender to collect immediately after default, rather than waiting for 
each payment's due date. 57 The insecurity clause expands this protection by 
allowing a lender to recover payment when the lender feels insecure.58 
However, the lender should not be able to exercise this discretion without 
some limitation.59 The logic behind limiting this discretion is that the clause 
should protect the lender, but it should not be used offensively by a lender 
to force the borrower to pay earlier than agreed to in the loan.60 While this 
power should be protected, it should not be abused.61 Therefore, whether or 
not an insecurity clause is valid involves a discussion of whether or not the 
party acted in good faith. 
B. The Duty of Good Faith in Contracts 
Generally, "[e]very contract imposes upon each party a duty of good 
faith ... in its performance and its enforcement."62 Courts have adopted an 
52. See supra note 28; see also Frederick P. Leaf, Acceleration Clauses in Sales and 
Secured Transactions: The Debtor's Burden Under Section 1-208 of the U.C.C., II B.C. L. 
REV. 531, 539 (1970). 
53. U.C.C. § 9-109 (2004). 
54. See Graf v. Hope Bldg. Corp., 171 N.E. 884, 885 (N.Y. 1930); see also Leaf, 
supra note 52, at 532. 
55. See Leaf, supra note 52, at 532. 
56. See Michael Giusto, Note, Mortgage Foreclosure for Secondary Breaches: A 
Practitioner's Guide to Defining "Security impairment," 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 2563, 2565 
(2005). 
57. See David Hahn, The Roles of Acceleration, 8 DEPAUL Bus. & COM. L.J. 229, 
238 (2010). 
58. See supra note 8. 
59. See discussion infra Part III. 
60. Brown v. AVEMCO Inv. Corp., 603 F.2d 1367, 1376 (9th Cir. 1979). 
61. Lenders should be able to collect the amount due when a debtor defaults, rather 
than having to wait for each installment payment to come due. However, lenders should not 
be able to arbitrarily implement an insecurity clause. 
62. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981). Similarly, the U.C.C. 
defines good faith as "honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial standards 
of fair dealing." U.C.C. § 1-201 (2004). The U.C.C. applies the obligation of good faith to all 
transactions in Section 1-304: "Every contract or duty within [the Uniform Commercial 
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implied duty of good faith in a number of contractual contexts.63 Nonethe-
less, it remains unclear whether an implied duty of good faith would apply 
specifically to the use of an insecurity clause in commercial mortgages.64 In 
order to protect commercial borrowers from the arbitrary application of 
insecurity clauses, courts should imply a duty of good faith for these lenders 
in their use of insecurity clauses.65 More specifically, the courts should re-
quire that lenders do not act in bad faith when using an insecurity clause.66 
Some courts are unwilling to imply a duty of good faith to contracts 
without significant limitation. The Texas Supreme Court ruled in English v. 
Fisher that an implied duty of good faith could not overcome express con-
tracted-for terms.67 The Texas Supreme Court adamantly rejected the notion 
that there should be an implied duty of good faith in every contract.68 It 
warned that adopting an implied covenant of good faith in every contract 
would jeopardize a party in a contract that tries to enforce the terms of the 
contract. 69 This decision is consistent with the belief that parties are free to 
contract as they please, and courts should not be able to adjust their agree-
ments.70 Likewise, some commentators warn that "[t]he inconsistent appli-
cation of the good faith doctrine to lending practices adds uncertainty and 
other costs to business transactions in abrogation of the fundamental pur-
Code] imposes an obligation of good faith in its performance and enforcement." !d.§ l-304. 
More specifically, the U.C.C. applies the obligation of good faith to insecurity clauses. /d. § 
1-309. However, the U.C.C. only applies to commercial consumer transactions and does not 
govern commercial mortgage loans. /d.§ 9-109. 
63. 17A AM. JUR. 2D Contracts§ 370 (2004) (citing Carrico v. Delp, 490 N.E.2d 
972,976 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986); Am. Bankers' Ins. Co. of Fla. v. Wells, 819 So. 2d 1196, 1206 
(Miss. 2001)). 
64. See Werner F. Ebke & James R. Griffin, Good Faith and Fair Dealing in Com-
mercial Lending Transactions: From Covenant to Duty and Beyond, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 1237, 
1239 (1989). 
65. See infra Part III. 
66. Bad faith is "(d]ishonesty of belief or purpose." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, 
supra note l, at 159. According to a comment in the Restatement: 
A complete catalogue of types of bad faith is impossible, but the following types 
are among those which have been recognized in judicial decisions: evasion of the 
spirit of the bargain, lack of diligence and slacking off, willful rendering of imper-
fect performance, abuse of a power to specifY terms, and interference with or fail-
ure to cooperate in the other party's performance. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 cmt. d (1981 ). 
67. Ebke & Griffin, supra note 64, at 1242-43. 
68. See id. at 1242. 
69. English v. Fischer, 660 S.W.2d 521, 522 (Tex. 1983). Fisher purchased a home 
from English using a promissory note secured by a lien on the house as consideration. ld. In 
1979, the home was destroyed in part by a fire. /d. There was a provision in the deed that 
stated that any insurance proceeds would go to English. ld. at 522-23. The Texas Supreme 
Court was unwilling to overturn this explicit contractual language based on an implied duty 
of good faith. /d. at 522. 
70. See Ebke & Griffin, supra note 64, at 1243. 
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poses of commercial law.m 1 The acceptance of implied covenants of good 
faith by the courts could have the ripple effect of making lenders hesitant to 
accelerate payment in any fashion. 72 This hesitancy could increase the cost 
of doing business for lenders and, ultimately, for borrowers who would find 
themselves with "greater difficulty in obtaining loans, higher interest rates, 
and less flexible credit arrangements."73 
On the other hand, some jurisdictions are willing to imply a duty of 
good faith more broadly to contract cases. A leading example of a court 
implying a duty of good faith to a contract is K.MC. Co. v. Irving Trust 
Co.74 In K.MC. Co., the Sixth Circuit held that the lender had breached an 
implied duty of good faith. 75 Typically, courts imply good faith in situations 
where one party is required to exercise a certain level of discretion.76 In 
K.MC. Co., Irving Trust Company was able to exercise discretion both in 
its decision to advance funds and its ability to demand payment.77 The court 
held that this discretion had to be limited by an obligation of good faith. 78 
Lenders similarly exercise their discretion in the execution of insecurity 
clauses in commercial mortgages. 
When a commercial mortgage includes an insecurity clause, the lender 
theoretically bargained for that clause. 79 The clause gives the lender the 
power to demand payment earlier than the due date if the lender feels inse-
cure.80 The lender is exercising its discretion to make this determination of 
71. Mark Snyderman, Comment, What's So Good About Good Faith? The Good 
Faith Performance Obligation in Commercial Lending, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1335, 1338 
(1988). 
72. See id. at 1337. 
73. /d. 
74. Cheryl Anderson, Note, Lender Liability: Breach of Good Faith in Lending and 
Related Theories, 64 N.D. L. REV. 273, 291 (1988). 
75. K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752, 762 (6th Cir. 1985). Irving Trust 
Company appealed from a judgment entered against it for breach of a financing agreement. 
/d. at 754. K.M.C. was involved in the grocery business. !d. In 1979, the two parties entered 
into a financing agreement that gave Irving a security interest in K.M.C. 's accounts receiva-
ble and inventory. /d. Additionally, the agreement provided K.M.C. a line of credit. !d. On 
March I, 1982, Irving refused to advance money requested by K.M.C., which would have 
increased the total loan amount. !d. K.M.C. argued that Irving breached its duty of good faith 
performance implied in the agreement when it refused to advance the money without giving 
any notice and that the collapse of the company was the result of this refusal. /d. Irving con-
tended that K.M.C. was already failing, and that their decision not to advance the money was 
made in good faith. !d. 
76. STEVEN J. BURTON, PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT LAW 433 (3d ed. 2006). 
77. K.M.C. Co., 757 F.2d at 760. 
78. !d. 
79. See BURTON, supra note 76, at 434 (explaining this principle in the context of a 
termination clause). 
80. This scenario is different from a demand note, which does not have an implied 
duty of good faith, because a demand note is structured so that the lender can demand pay-
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insecurity. If a lender in good faith believes that it will not be able to recov-
er payment from the borrower, then the lender should be able to use the 
insecurity clause because it bargained for this right.81 However, if the lender 
uses this clause for another reason, one that it did not bargain for, then the 
courts should not allow it. Using the clause in this manner would allow the 
lender to get something that it did not bargain for. The lender would receive 
payment earlier than arranged in the contract, even though the lender is se-
cure. Early payment in this manner is not the purpose of an insecurity 
clause.82 The clause is supposed to protect the lender from insecurity.83 The 
lender should be able to use the insecurity clause when it deems itself inse-
cure, but the courts should limit the use by implying a duty of good faith.84 
C. The Relationship Between Appraisals and Commercial Mortgage Lend-
ing Agreements 
The appraiser plays an important role in commercial mortgage loans 
because the appraiser determines the current value of the collateral.85 The 
collateral provides a second avenue of collection for the lender if the bor-
rower does not pay in full, so the value of the collateral is relevant.86 The 
appraiser's determination can greatly affect the loan when it is formed and 
later if the collateral is reappraised. 87 Appraising is an art, not a science. In 
order to be relevant, an appraisal must be based upon "reliable and timely 
information on the market value of the real estate collateral."88 Appraisers 
use comparable properties to determine the value of the property they are 
ment at any time and for any reason. EDWARD F. MANNINO, LENDER LIABILITY AND BANKING 
LITIGATION§ 5.03 (2012). 
81. See BURTON, supra note 76, at 434 (explaining this principle in the context of a 
termination clause). 
82. See supra note 8. The insecurity clause allows the lender to demand payment if 
it believes the borrower will default, so if the lender is not actually insecure about receiving 
payment from the borrower, then it should not be able to use the insecurity clause. !d. 
83. !d. 
84. BURTON, supra note 76, at 433. 
85. See Interagency Appraisal and Evaluation Guidelines, 75 Fed. Reg. 77,450, 
77,450 (Dec. 10, 2010). 
86. See supra notes 6, 7 and accompanying text. 
87. If the appraiser decreases the value of the secured property, then the property 
may no longer be considered sufficient to act as a second avenue of recovery for the lender. 
See supra notes 6, 7 and accompanying text. 
88. Examining the Continuing Crisis in Residential Foreclosures and the Emerging 
Commercial Real Estate Crisis: Perspectives from Atlanta Before the Subcomm. on Domestic 
Policy of the H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov 't Reform, Ill th Cong. 169 (2009), available at 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-lll hhrg65548/pdf/CHRG-lll hhrg65548.pdf [herein-
after Examining the Continuing Crisis] (statement of Jon D. Greenlee, Associate Director, 
Div. of Banking Supervision and Regulation, Fed. Reserve). 
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appraising.89 The number of good comparable properties available can affect 
how realistic the valuation of the property actually is; "[t]he greater the 
number of good comparable data used, the better the result, provided a 
proper analysis is made."90 Every choice the appraiser makes can affect the 
appraised value of the property .91 This uncertainty makes relying on ap-
praisal information very problematic in the application of insecurity clauses. 
This variability should be taken into consideration when determining if a 
lender is insecure, particularly when the reappraisal is the primary basis for 
the insecurity claim. 
1. The Potential Effects of Inaccurate Appraisals 
A major concern for borrowers is the potential variance of appraisals.92 
An appraisal is ultimately just an estimate based on a variety of factors, 
such as "general economic conditions" and "the sales and holding prices of 
comparable properties."93 The result of this process is the potential for im-
precise appraisals. If a lender has collateral reappraised and the collateral is 
appraised at a lower value than it originally was, then it could be devastat-
ing to a borrower. The lender could potentially deem itself insecure based 
on this lower appraisai.94 The appraiser's valuation will determine whether 
the collateral is still considered a sufficient method of collection for the 
lender.95 It is daunting for an appraisal to have this much power because it is 
subjective and uncertain by nature.96 When a lender applies an insecurity 
clause based on the underlying value of the collateral, the court should con-
sider the influence the appraisal had on the lender's determination. 
Today's market has also substantially affected the reliability of ap-
praisals. Because of the economic downturn and the decline in the commer-
cial real estate market, there has been a decrease in the number of normal 
property sales.97 In addition, the sales that have occurred have often been 
distressed sales.98 These types of sales do not accurately reflect the value of 
the collateral, but rather the value in a depressed market where almost all 
89. See The Real Estate Appraisal Process, supra note 12. 
90. CAL. DEP'T OF REAL ESTATE, REFERENCE BOOK-A REAL ESTATE GUIDE 342-43 
(201 0), available at http://www.dre.ca.gov/pdf_ docs/refl7.pdf. 
91. See generally K. Lee Hyder, The Appraisal Process, 75 APPRAISAL J. 227 (2007) 
(explaining the basics of the appraisal process). 
92. See generally id. 
93. ld. at 229-30. 
94. See supra note 8. 
95. See supra notes 6, 7 and accompanying text. 
96. See generally Robert F. Reilly, What Lawyers Need to Know About Real Estate 
Appraisal Reports, PRAC. REAL EsT. LAW., Jan. 2005, at 7 (describing the components of a 
real estate appraisal report). 
97. See Examining the Continuing Crisis, supra note 88, at 162-63, 165, 170. 
98. /d. at 165-66, 169. 
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property decreases in value.99 As the market worsens, an appraisal becomes 
more and more of an estimate and less of a comparison because there are 
fewer truly comparable properties to use in the appraisal. 100 In times like 
these, it is even more important for the courts to imply a duty of good faith 
to the use of insecurity clauses. 
2. How Minimal Regulation Has Negatively Impacted the Appraisal 
Industry 
The Ethical Rules of the Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal 
Practices (USP AP) state, "An appraiser must promote and preserve the pub-
lic trust inherent in appraisal practice by observing the highest standards of 
professional ethics."101 More specifically, in regard to an appraiser's con-
duct, the appraiser "must not perform an assignment with bias," "must not 
advocate the cause or interest of any party or issue," and "must not accept 
an assignment that includes the reporting of predetermined opinions and 
conclusions."102 Although these rules may provide some guidance for how 
appraisers should behave and may provide some protection for third parties, 
who can be directly affected by an appraisal, overall, the "appraisal industry 
lacks internal regulations."103 Commercial mortgage loans are dependent on 
the value of their underlying collateral. The underlying contract is based on 
the collateral providing a sufficient second avenue of collection if the bor-
rower fails to pay.'04 If the industry that determines the value of the collat-
eral "lacks internal regulation[]," this lack of regulation should raise con-
cern for a borrower whose loan is dependent upon these valuations. 105 
One reason Congress passed the Financial Institutions Reform, Re-
covery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA) was to respond to the lack 
of regulation in the appraisal industry and the potential harsh result an ap-
praisal can create. 106 However, FIRREA has not effectively regulated the 
appraisal industry because the Act left the appraisal industry self-regulated 
with minimal federal guidelines. 107 As a self-regulated industry, the apprais-
99. See id. 
IOO. See How Do Market Conditions Affect How a Real Property Appraiser Analyzes 
Comparable Sales?, ACCUVAL, http://www.accuval.net/insights/askappraiser/detail. 
php?ID=I9 (last visited Apr. I9, 20I2). 
101. APPRAISAL STANDARDS BD., APPRAISAL FOUND., UNIFORM STANDARDS OF 
PROFESSIONAL APPRAISAL PRACTICE U-7 (20I2), available at http://www.uspap.org (herein-
after USPAP]. 
I02. !d. 
I03. Cherokee W. Wooley, Comment, Regulation of Real Estate Appraisers and 
Appraisals: The Effects of FIRREA, 43 EMORY L.J. 3.57, 357 (1994). 
I 04. See supra note 6. 
I05. Wooley, supra note I03, at 357. 
I 06. /d. at 358-59. 
107. /d. at 359. 
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al industry has not successfully protected all of the users of appraisals. 108 In 
a commercial mortgage scenario, the appraiser's duty lies with the one that 
hires it, typically the lender. 109 This setup leaves the borrower somewhat 
unprotected in regard to the appraiser's actions. According to the USPAP, 110 
appraisers do not normally have an ethical duty towards the third parties 
affected by their appraisals. 111 Yet, the appraisers can have considerable 
influence over these third parties. This potential influence is frightening for 
a borrower because a lender uses the appraiser's valuation to determine the 
value of the collateral, but the appraiser historically has no ethical duty to 
the borrower. 112 Appraisers know that third parties often rely on their reports 
to obtain or maintain loans, but the appraisers owe no duty to the third par-
ty.113 There is no established good faith requirement among the industry, so 
if an appraisal is inaccurate, the property owner does not have many ave-
nues to pursue to hold the appraiser accountable for the fallout from this 
lower appraisal. 
Additionally, regulatory pressures have affected the commercial mort-
gage industry and contributed to lenders' bad faith implementation of inse-
curity clauses. When regulators force banks "to write down performing 
commercial real estate loans based solely on appraisals and absorption 
rates," this regulation raises concern for the entire industry. 114 Bank manag-
ers' concern is that these loans are being written down without considering 
'"the borrower's ability to repay its loan, the borrower's history of repaying 
other loans with the lender, favorable loan-to-value ratios and guaran-
tors."'115 The argument made by regulators in response to this argument is 
that the value of the underlying collateral is generally linked to the likeli-
hood of repayment because both are based on the success of the project. 116 
Regulators believe that the collateral can thus be a strong indicator of the 
I 08. See id. at 364-66. 
109. 31 AM.JUR.2DProofofFacts§ I (1982). 
110. "[T]he Federal Reserve requires its regulated institution to have real estate ap-
praisals that meet minimum appraisal standards, including the Uniform Standards of Profes-
sional Appraisal Practice, and contain sufficient information to support the institution's credit 
decision." Examining the Continuing Crisis, supra note 88, at 169. 
Ill. USPAP, supra note 101, at U-2, U-7. 
112. 31 AM. JUR. 2D Proof of Facts§ I (1982) ("When these third persons are so 
injured, the law has not always gone to their aid, because of an absence of privity of contract 
or a lack of a duty of care .... "). 
113. See generally USPAP, supra note 101 (explaining that borrowers are not intend-
ed users if the lender is the client). 
114. Bank Examiners Defend Collateral Valuation Policies Before House Commit-
tees, APPRAISER NEWS ONLINE, Mar. 3, 2010, http://www.appraisalinstitute.org/ano/ 
Share/Default.aspx?volume= II &numbr=5/6&id=9760. 
115. /d. (quoting Stephen Andrews, President and CEO of Bank of Alameda). 
116. /d. 
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success of the project and the likelihood of repayment. 117 Although there is 
some truth in this relationship between the value of the collateral and the 
likelihood of repayment, there are times when the connection could be mis-
leading. For example, the current market is in a decline, so most commercial 
real estate has decreased in value. 118 In a situation like this, the value of the 
collateral may be less representative of the borrower's ability to repay and 
more representative of the overall change in the market. 
Recently, several federal agencies have issued appraisal guidelines, 
which may have some protection for borrowers who are concerned with the 
uncertainty of appraisals. 119 These guidelines take into consideration techno-
logical advancements in the field of appraisal as well as industry develop-
ments.120 One objective of the guidelines is to promote consistency among 
appraisals. 121 In particular, the guidelines outline how real estate collateral 
should be evaluated and updated. 122 Among other requirements, the guide-
lines require that a real estate appraisal program at a financial institution 
make sure that those performing and reviewing appraisals are independent, 
that the appraisal contains sufficient information, and that criteria are estab-
lished for monitoring property values. 123 The guidelines also address issues 
that can arise because of undue influence exerted by the employer of the 
appraiser. 124 Specifically, institutions cannot communicate a predetermined 
property value to the appraiser or specify a minimum value for the proper-
ty.125 In the future, these guidelines may help protect third parties from the 
potential burden an appraiser can cause them. 
D. The Current Commercial Real Estate Market 
At the erid of 2007, a noticeable decline began in the Unites States' 
economy and in the commercial real estate market. 126 Although it has done 
better than the residential mortgage market, the commercial real estate mar-
117. See id. 
118. See infra Section J.D. 
119. Interagency Appraisal and Evaluation Guidelines, 75 Fed. Reg. 77,450, 77,450-
51. 
120. !d. 
121. /d. at 77,450, 77,451. 
122. Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Agencies Issue Final 
Appraisal and Evaluation Guidelines (Dec. 2, 2010), available at http://www.federalreserve. 
gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/20 I 0 1202a.htm. 
123. Interagency Appraisal and Evaluation Guidelines, 75 Fed. Reg. at 77,457. 
124. See id. 
125. /d. 
126. ECONOMIC ACTIVITY, supra note 19, at I. 
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ket is also facing its own problems. 127 Because of problems with the com-
mercial real estate market, the number of "troubled commercial real-estate 
loans is skyrocketing."128 At the end of 2010, nearly nine percent of com-
mercial real estate mortgage loans are delinquent. 129 Commercial lenders 
have not struggled with commercial mortgage default rates this high since 
1992.130 This market could cause problems for all banks, especially smaller 
more regionalized banks, which usually hold a larger percentage of com-
mercial real estate loans than other loans. 131 As the value of their collateral 
decreases, the likelihood that they will suffer losses increases. 132 In addition, 
the high default rate on commercial mortgages could '"impinge on their 
ability'" to make loans in other areas, such as to consumers. 133 This type of 
problem is not limited to a few large banks. 134 This problem affects many 
banks that are involved in commercial real estate loans. 135 It is estimated that 
banks could ultimately suffer $250 billion in losses from these commercial 
127. Kerry E. Grace, Mortgage-Securities Defaults Rise, WALL ST. J., Jan. 21, 2009, 
at Cll, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SBI23250443252201023.html? 
KEYWORDS=secured+commercial+collateral#dummy. · 
128. Lingling Wei, Banks Get New Rules on Property, WALL ST. J., Oct. 31,2009, at 
B I, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB 125694507086819833.htmi?KEYWORDS= 
commercial+collateralKEYWORDS%3Dcommercial+collateral. 
129. Floyd Norris, The Upside? Things Could Be Worse, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 2010, 
at B I, available at http:/ /www.nytimes.com/2010/12/24/business/24norris.html? _r= I & 
scp=3&sq=commercial%201oan&st=cse. 
130. Dealbook, Study Shows Commercial Property Trouble at US. Banks, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 25, 2010, http:/ /dealbook.nytimes.corn/20 I 0/05/25/study-shows-commercial-
property-trouble-at-u-s-banks/. 
131. !d. 
132. See Robb Mandelbaum, Can Government Help Small Businesses?, N.Y. TIMES 
You'RE THE Boss BLOG (July 29, 2010, 7:00 AM), http://boss.blogs.nytimes. 
corn/20 I 0/07 /29/can-government-help-small-businesses/?scp= II &sq=%22commercial 
%201oan%22&st=cse. Mandelbaum states: 
!d. 
[T]he banks trying to get into compliance find that the current market value of this 
commercial real estate will not support the value of the loans that are currently out-
standing, and in many cases the borrowers do not have the reserve equity that is 
necessary to downsize the loan. Many of these borrowers are forced to default on 
the loans. And there is no functioning market for the bank to sell that property ex-
cept at distressed prices. Right now the distressed values are 20 to 30 cents on the 
dollar, which drives the banks out of business, because it depletes their capital. 
133. Dan Levy & David Henry, Commercial Mortgage Default Rate in US. More 
Than Doubles, BLOOMBERG, Feb. 24, 2010, http://www.bloomberg.com/ 
apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aj9Yttz_UYxg (quoting Sam Chandan, Global Chief 
Economist, Real Capital Analytics). 
134. See Demyanyk & Cherny, supra note 23. 
135. !d. 
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real estate loans. 136 Despite the national breadth of this issue, the regulation 
of these loans is governed separately by the states. 137 
II. V ARYTNG APPROACHES TO REGULATION OF COMMERCIAL MORTGAGE 
LENDING 
Currently, there is no uniform standard to regulate the use of insecuri-
ty clauses in commercial mortgage lending. This regulation is generally left 
up to individual state jurisdictions. 138 In comparison to commercial lending 
for personal property, which is governed by the U.C.C., commercial lending 
involving real estate does not have a specific statutory standard that requires 
good faith in the application of insecurity clauses. 139 This lack of a uniform 
standard leaves the states with the power to determine how this type of 
clause should be regulated. Although jurisdictions may differ in their ap-
proaches to the application of good faith in contracts, most imply a duty of 
good faith in all contracts. 140 Even though many courts have addressed the 
issue of an implied duty of good faith in contracts, there is little precedent 
regarding the role of this duty in the application of insecurity clauses m 
commercial mortgages. 141 
A. How Various States Have Approached the Implied Duty of Good Faith 
Many courts have implied a duty of good faith in contracts across a 
wide variety of contractual arenas. 142 However, courts have yet to fully ad-
dress what constitutes a breach of the implied duty of good faith in connec-
tion with commercial mortgages. 143 More specifically, it is unclear whether 
the inappropriate use of an insecurity clause can breach this duty. States 
136. Nicole Lucht & Buck Wargo, Las Vegas Braces for Commercial Foreclosures, 
LAS VEGAS SUN, Apr. 17, 2009, http://www.lasvegassun.com/news/2009/apr/17/lv-braces-
commercial-foreclosures/ (referencing The Wall Street Journal). 
137. See Legal Info. Inst., Real Estate Transactions: An Overview, CORNELL U. L. 
ScH., http://topics.law.cornell.edu/wex!Real_estate_transactions (last visited Apr. 19, 2012). 
138. See id. "Real estate transactions are governed by a wide body of federal statutes 
and a combination of state statutes and common law." /d. "The requirements established by 
state law often differ significantly from one state to the next." /d. 
139. See discussion supra Section I.B. 
140. See discussion infra Section II.A. 
141. As of February 24, 2011, a search on Westlaw in the "All State and Federal 
Cases" database with the search terms '"commercial mortgage' /p insecur!" yielded one 
result. This result, In re Friesenhahn, 169 B.R. 615 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1994), is not relevant 
to this Note. 
142. See discussion supra Section I. B. 
143. See discussion supra Section I. B. 
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vary in their interpretations of the implied duty of good faith; however, the 
trend seems to favor implying a duty of good faith into contracts. 144 
1. Florida 
Florida is one of the states in the nation that has been hit extremely 
hard by the current foreclosure crisis. 145 The magnitude of the crisis has 
made the state a particularly relevant player in the issue of bad faith imple-
mentation of insecurity clauses. As explained by the Supreme Court of Flor-
ida in Delgado v. Strong, "[i]t is well-established that courts of equity may 
refuse to foreclose a mortgage when an acceleration of the due date would 
render the acceleration unconscionable and the result would be inequitable 
and unjust."146 The holding in Delgado established that if a technical error 
alone activated an acceleration clause, the court could deny foreclosure be-
cause it would be unjust. 147 Florida mortgage law specifies that the court of 
equity has the power to help a mortgagor whose mortgage is accelerated by 
unjust conduct of the mortgagee. 148 This general rule also allows relief to be 
given to the mortgagor anytime a default caused by an '"unharmful breach 
of a condition of the mortgage"' would cause the foreclosure to be unjust. 149 
In Clark v. Lachenmeier, the plaintiff argued that the defendant's failure to 
get the plaintiffs consent before selling the secured property to another 
party, which was required by the mortgage agreement, warranted foreclo-
sure.150 However, the court disagreed and stated that the foreclosure should 
be denied because it would be inequitable to proceed with the foreclosure 
on only that basis. 151 
Florida law establishes that if a lender in a personal property secured 
transaction wants to accelerate payment or foreclose on the collateral as a 
144. The following states that are discussed represent a diverse geographical sample. 
145. The Rogue Economist, A Rush to Foreclose: 5 Reasons Why Your Loan Officer 
Wants Your House, ARTICLEB.COM (Oct. 23, 2010, 11:57 PM), http://www.published-
articles.com/ Art/52330/208/ A-Rush-To-Foreclose-5-Reasons-Why-Your-Loan-Officer-
Wants-Your-House.html. 
146. 360 So. 2d 73, 75 (Fla. 1978). Mortgagors purchased some industrial property 
from mortgagees, but were unaware that they had a duty to insure the property. !d. at 74. 
After learning of this duty, the mortgagors tried to insure the property. /d. 
147. /d. at 75-76. The court ultimately allowed the foreclosure to proceed in this case 
because although it was only a technical error that had triggered the acceleration clause, the 
property was in fact insecure. /d. This scenario was sufficient to allow the foreclosure to 
proceed. /d. at 76. 
148. Clark v. Lachenmeier, 237 So. 2d 583, 584-85 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970); see 
also Wootton v. Matheson, 439 So. 2d 1007, 1008 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983); Amerifirst Fed. 
Sav. & Loan Ass'n of Miami v. Century 21 Commodore Plaza, Inc., 416 So. 2d 45,46 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1982). 
149. Clark, 237 So. 2d at 585 (quoting 22 FLA. JUR. Mortgages§ 214 (1965)). 
150. /d. at 584. 
151. /d. at 585. 
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result of the lender becoming insecure, the lender must have a good faith 
belief that future payments will be impaired. 152 In regard to secured personal 
property transactions, Florida law explains that a lender acts in bad faith if it 
"has no reason to feel less secure on the date that it repossesses collateral 
than it did when the note was executed."153 The traditional purpose of an 
insecurity clause was to protect the lender's security. 154 Florida courts have 
held that a lender may enforce an insecurity provision in a secured transac-
tion when its security has been impaired. 155 
2. Massachusetts 
Massachusetts's statutes only address good faith in the context of the 
U.C.C. Massachusetts's statute imposes an "obligation of good faith in [the] 
performance" of any transaction governed by the Massachusetts U.C.C. 156 
Outside of this context, there is no statutory reference to good faith being 
required in the implementation of insecurity clauses. Instead, the law has 
developed through the courts. 
In Massachusetts, the courts have established that there is a duty in 
contracts to act in good faith, but the courts have not uniformly defined 
what that duty entails. 157 In Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., the Su-
preme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that there was an implied duty 
of good faith in a contract regarding an at will employment termination. 158 
Similarly, in the commercial loan context, the Massachusetts Court of Ap-
peals held that every contract has an implied duty of good faith. 159 In this 
152. 47 FLA. JUR. 2d Secured Transactions§ 126 (2012). 
!53. 6 FLA. JUR. 2d Bills and Notes § II 0 (20 12). 
154. Consol. Capital Properties, II, Ltd. v. Nat'! Bank ofN. Am., 420 So. 2d 618,622 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982). 
155. !d. at 622-23 (citing First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n of Englewood v. Lockwood, 
385 So. 2d 156, 159, 160 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980); Woodcrest Apartments, Ltd. v. IPA 
Realty Partners Richardson Palmer, 3rd Investment KG, 397 So. 2d 364, 366 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1981 )). 
156. MASS. GEN. LAWSch. 106, § 1-203 (2011). 
157. Tory A. Weigand, The Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing in Commercial 
Contracts in Massachusetts, 88 MASS. L. REV. 174, 174 (2004). "Despite its time-honored 
status, however, its scope and application remain elusive and ill-defined." !d.; see also Lori J. 
Henkel, Annotation, Bank's Liability for Breach of Implied Contract of Good Faith and Fair 
Dealing, 55 A.L.R. 4TH 1026 (Supp. 2012) (citing T.W. Nickerson, Inc. v. Fleet Nat'! Bank, 
898 N.E.2d 868, 879 (Mass. App. Ct. 2009)). 
158. 364 N.E.2d 1251, 1256 (Mass. 1977). In this case, a salesman brought an action 
against a former employer regarding his at will termination. !d. at 1253. 
159. Shawmut Bank, N.A. v. Wayman, 606 N.E.2d 925, 928 (Mass. App. Ct. 1993). 
In this case, a guarantor of a commercial loan claimed that the bank had broken its implied 
duty of good faith. !d. Although the court agreed that there was an implied duty of good faith 
that was applicable to all contracts, including the contract at issue, the court held that the 
bank had not violated their duty to act in good faith. !d. 
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lender/borrower context, the implied duty of good faith "requires that the 
lender be honest in its dealings with borrowers and not purposefully injure 
their right to obtain the benefit of the contract."160 Despite the courts' uni-
formity in holding that there is an implied duty of good faith in contracts, 
the duty of good faith has been determined on a case-by-case factual analy-
sis of each particular contract rather than by a defined standard. 161 
3. Michigan 
Like many other jurisdictions, Michigan courts have held that a duty 
of good faith is implied in contracts, specifically commercial loan agree-
ments, but have been careful to not imply this duty when the contract terms 
are clear. 162 They have also recognized that this duty is relevant when one 
party is able to exercise discretion over its performance under the con-
tract.163 More recently, the Sixth Circuit found that there was an implied 
duty of good faith "only where one party to the contract makes its perfor-
mance a matter of its own discretion."164 The court restricts the use of the 
good faith covenant to circumstances where one party's performance is un-
der its discretion. 165 One way discretion arises in a contract is when the con-
tract "defers decision on a particular term."166 By this interpretation, insecu-
rity clauses would involve discretion because the term is not decided until a 
later time when one party exercises its discretion. Lenders use their discre-
tion to determine when they are insecure; therefore, lenders should still be 
bound by an implied duty of good faith in their use of insecurity clauses. 
160. Henkel, supra note 157 (citing FAMM Steel, Inc. v. Sovereign Bank, 571 F.3d 
93, 100 (1st Cir. 2009) (applying Massachusetts law)). 
161. Weigand,supranote 157,at 174,183. 
162. Van Amem Co. v. Mfrs. Hanover Leasing Corp., 776 F. Supp. 1220, 1222-23 
(E.D. Mich. 1991). The lender did not breach the implied duty of good faith by refusing to 
make the requested loans to the borrower because the borrower did not submit some of the 
required documentation by the arranged date. Jd at 1224; see also Gen. Aviation, Inc. v. 
Cessna Aircraft Co., 915 F.2d 1038, 1041-42 (6th Cir. 1990) (finding that the manufacturer 
did not breach an implied duty of good faith when executing a termination agreement be-
cause the terms of the contract were express and the manufacturer did not act in bad faith). 
163. Burkhardt v. City Nat'l Bank of Detroit, 226 N.W.2d 678, 680 (Mich. Ct. App. 
1975). The Burkhardts made monthly payments to the bank towards their loan. !d. at 679. 
There were escrow accounts set up as part of the agreement, and the bank used its discretion 
in choosing an accounting method to create and maintain the accounts. !d. 
164. Stephenson v. Allstate Ins. Co., 328 F.3d 822, 826 (6th Cir. 2003). 
165. !d. 
166. Hubbard Chevrolet Co. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 873 F.2d 873, 876-77 (5th Cir. 
1989). 
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4. Illinois 
In 1987, the Illinois Mortgage Foreclosure Act was enacted with the 
purpose of being a "comprehensive statutory scheme governing all mort-
gage foreclosures in Illinois [and] codifl:ying] much of the common law of 
foreclosures." 167 However, there is no mention in the Act of insecurity 
clauses or good or bad faith in regard to a lender's actions.168 This compre-
hensive law, written only about twenty years ago, does not mention any of 
the problems associated with a lender's bad faith implementation of an inse-
curity clause. 169 The current statute still does not address lender liability 
with regard to the application of insecurity clauses. 170 
Although some Illinois courts have held that there is an implied duty 
of good faith in all contracts, others have declined to extend the implied 
duty of good faith to cases outside the realm of insurance and employ-
ment.171 In Koehler v. First National Bank of Louisville, the Appellate Court 
of Illinois held that "[i]n the absence of compelling policy considerations," 
the implied duty of good faith could not be extended to a particular area of 
law.172 The Illinois courts have addressed the issue of an implied duty of 
good faith towards a party that is in a position with discretionary power. 173 
In Carrico v. Delp, the Appellate Court of Illinois held that "[g]ood faith ... 
requires the party vested with contractual discretion to exercise it reasona-
bly, and he may not'do so arbitrarily, capriciously, or in a manner incon-
sistent with the reasonable expectations of the parties."174 
5. New York 
New York, like many other states, does not have a statute that governs 
the application of insecurity clauses to real property transactions. Instead, 
the law has been developed solely through the courts. The New York Court 
of Appeals held that the enforcement of an acceleration clause when interest 
was not paid within the twenty-one days required in the loan agreement was 
167. Robert T. Biskup, Defaulting Borrowers Beware: The Law Is Watching You, 
CBA REc., Sept. 1994, at 18, 18-19. 
168. See id. at 18-20. 
169. See id. 
170. See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/15-1107 (2009). 
171. Koehler v. First Nat'l Bank of Louisville, 597 N.E.2d 1261, 1264 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1992). 
172. !d. Bank customers sued based on an implied duty of good faith, claiming that 
the bank had breached this duty when it would not close a loan with the customers based on a 
rate quoted in a commitment memo./d. at 1262-63. 
173. Carrico v. Delp, 490 N.E.2d 972, 976 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986). 
174. !d. 
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not unconscionable and should be allowed. 175 Without an unconscionable 
act, the court has no reason or way to deny the use of the acceleration 
clause, even if others would consider the lender unduly harsh to actually 
impose it. 176 
In Luxonomy Cars, Inc. v Citibank, N.A., the New York Supreme 
Court, Appellate Division, held there was an implied duty of good faith in a 
bank's implementation of an acceleration clause. 177 Generally, New York 
courts will allow the enforcement of an acceleration clause for breach by 
nonpayment or nonpayment of interest.178 However, when another provision 
in the loan agreement is breached, "New York courts will not allow foreclo-
sure unless the mortgagee can show his security has been impaired."179 The 
idea behind this provision is that the courts are not willing to enforce a 
harsh penalty on a borrower for an insignificant breach of the agreement, 
but the courts have not explicitly explained what would qualify as a security 
impairment. 180 On the other hand, the courts are not willing to impose a duty 
of good faith that "would be inconsistent with other terms of the contractual 
relationship."181 They recognize that there is a limit to the implied duty of 
good faith. 182 
6. California 
In California, contracts contain an implied duty of good faith. 183 The 
courts recognize that this implied duty is especially important when one 
party has a discretionary power that affects the rights of the other party. 184 
The basis behind this view is that both parties should "refrain from doing 
anything [that] will have the effect of destroying or in juring the right of the 
other party to receive the fruits of the contract."185 This type of reasoning 
was central to the United States District Court's holding in Ce/ador Interna-
175. Grafv. Hope Bldg. Corp., 171 N.E. 884,885 (N.Y. 1930). 
176. /d. 
177. 408 N.Y.S.2d 951,953-54 (App. Div. 1978). The court held that although there 
was an implied duty of good faith in this instance, the bank did not breach that duty. !d. at 
954. 
178. Michael Giusto, Mortgage Foreclosure for Secondary Breaches: A Practition-
er's Guide to Defining "Security Impairment," 26 CARDOZO L. REv. 2563, 2564 (2005). 
179. /d. 
180. /d. 
181. Henkel, supra note 157 (citing Emigrant Mortg. Co. v. Chi. Fin. Servs., Inc., 898 
N.E.2d 1069 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007) (applying New York law)). 
182. See id. 
183. /d. (citing Mangindin v. Wash. Mut. Bank, 637 F. Supp. 2d 700 (N.D. Cal. 
2009) (applying California law)). 
184. /d. (citing Shahani v. United Commercial Bank, 457 B.R. 775 (N.D. Cal. 2011) 
(applying California law)). 
185. /d. (citing Mangindin, 637 F. Supp. 2d 700 (applying California law)). 
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tiona/ Ltd. v. Walt Disney Co. 186 The court held that a breach of the implied 
duty of good faith involves "a conscious and deliberate act that 'unfairly 
frustrates the agreed common purposes and disappoints the reasonable ex-
pectations of the other party. "'187 
?.Nevada 
Nevada is one of the states that has struggled the most with commer-
cial foreclosures. 188 As of October 2009, it was ranked third out of all states 
for commercial real estate delinquencies. 189 In April 2009, Las Vegas was 
ranked third in the United States for troubled commercial properties. 190 Ne-
vada defines a commercial mortgage loan as one that, "[d]irectly or indirect-
ly, is secured by a lien on commercial property" and "[i]s created with the 
consent of the owner of the commercial property."191 In A. C. Shaw Con-
struction, Inc., the Supreme Court of Nevada held that there is an implied 
duty of good faith in all contracts. 192 It noted especially that the implied duty 
was particularly relevant in regard to the term of the contract that allowed 
one party to use its discretion.193 
8. Arizona 
Arizona is another state that has been devastated by the economic 
downtum. 194 Phoenix, in particular, has been hit hard because of "rampant 
overbuilding, a national economic crisis, spiking unemployment and a near 
halt in population growth."195 In this area, lenders have begun to issue fore-
186. 347 F. Supp. 2d 846, 852 (C.D. Cal. 2004). Plaintiffs, TV Producers, sued their 
broadcasting companies alleging a breach of the duty of good faith based on a number of 
actions taken by the broadcasting companies. /d. at 850-51. 
187. ld. at 852 (quoting Careau & Co. v. Sec. Pac. Bus. Credit, 272 Cal. Rptr. 387, 
400 (Ct. App. 1990)). 
188. Steve Green, Nevada Ranks Third in Rate of Delinquent Commercial Loans, 
LAS VEGAS SUN, Oct. 14, 2009, http://www.lasvegassun.com/news/2009/oct/14/nevada-
ranks-third-rate-delinquent-commercial-loan/. 
189. /d. 
190. Lucht & Wargo, supra note 136 (ranking New York and Los Angeles ahead of 
Las Vegas for the number of troubled commercial properties). 
191. NEV. REV. STAT.§ 645E.030 (2010). 
192. A. C. Shaw Constr., Inc. v. Washoe Cnty., 784 P.2d 9, 9 (Nev. 1989). 
193. !d. at II (noting that one party was able to "terminate the contract at its conven-
ience"). 
194. See Matthew N. Murray, Resolving Arizona's Budget Mess: Do It Right, and the 
State Wins; Do It Wrong, and We'll Suffer for Generations, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Jan. 8, 2011, 
http://www.azcentral.com/arizonarepublic/viewpoints/articles/20 11/01/08/201101 08arizona-
budget-murray.htrnl. 
195. Rudolf, supra note 3; see J. Craig Anderson, Arizona Commercial Real Estate 
Brokers: Some Lenders Ignore Crisis, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, May 30, 2010, http://www.azcentral. 
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closures notices on many commercial properties. 196 Over the past decade, 
the foreclosure rate was "practically zero."197 This increase in foreclosure 
notices is due primarily to the decrease in property values. 198 This area epit-
omizes the issue of lenders applying insecurity clauses based on decreases 
in property value in an area where the overall market has significantly de-
clined. 
Arizona courts have implied a duty of good faith in a number of sce-
narios. In Richter v. Dairy Queen of Southern Arizona, Inc., the Court of 
Appeals of Arizona held that a franchisor had to exercise in good faith its 
discretion over withholding consent. 199 A year later, this court once again 
held that there is an implied duty of good faith in contracts.200 This court 
expanded its interpretation to include '"[s]ubterfuges and evasions"' as vio-
lations of the implied duty of good faith. 201 Additionally, the Supreme Court 
of Arizona has implied a duty of good faith in many instances.202 
B. Attempts at Establishing Uniformity Among the Nation in Addressing 
Bad Faith in Insecurity Clauses 
The American Law Institute created the Restatement (Third) of Prop-
erty (Mortgages) in 1997 to create uniformity in a range of mortgage law 
com/business/articles/20 10/05/30/20 I 00530biz-arizona-commercial-real-estate-market-
Jenders.html. 
196. J. Craig Anderson, Lenders Increase Efforts on Bad Loans: With Delinquencies 
Up on Commercial Property, Use of Notes on the Rise, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Aug. 29, 2010, 
http:/ /www.azcentral.com/12news/news/articles/20 I 0/08/29/20 I 00829biz-lenders-increase-
efforts-bad-1oans0829.html. 
197. J. Craig Anderson, Commercial Foreclosures Rocket: Valley Is 'at the Tip of the 




199. 643 P.2d 508, 509 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982). Franchisees argued that the franchisor 
unreasonably withheld its consent. !d. 
200. Diagnostic Lab., Inc. v. PBL Consultants, 666 P.2d 515, 519 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
1983). Two doctors worked at a laboratory and at a medical center. !d. at 517. They signed a 
non-competition agreement with the laboratory, which the doctor's current work at the Med-
ical Center did not violate. Id. at 517-18. However, a few years later, the Medical Center 
expanded its services, which put it in competition with the laboratory. !d. at 518. 
20 I. ld. at 519 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 cmt. d 
(1981)). 
202. See Enyart v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 985 P.2d 556, 558, 561 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
1998) (noting that the insurer failed to purchase a back-up annuity as part of a settlement 
agreement); Wells Fargo Bank v. Ariz. Laborers, Teamsters & Cement Masons Loc~l No. 
395 Pension Trust Fund, 38 P.3d 12, 17-18, 28 (Ariz. 2002) (noting that the interim financer 
provided information to permanent financer regarding borrower). 
Creating Insecurity 235 
topics.203 This Restatement states that a lender's bad faith is a defense to the 
use of an acceleration clause. 204 Although the Restatement provides some 
guidance on the use of insecurity clauses, particularly not allowing these 
clauses to be used if the mortgagee has acted in bad faith/05 it has not been 
successful in establishing uniformity among the states. State courts can 
adopt provisions of the Restatement if they address a particular issue in liti-
gation that is discussed in the Restatement.206 
Although this Restatement has addressed the issue of bad faith in ac-
celeration clauses, it has not specifically addressed a lender's implied duty 
to act in good faith when using an insecurity clause. The Restatement does 
not go into enough detail in the arena of good faith in commercial mortgage 
insecurity clauses. There needs to be a more comprehensive and specific 
approach to the treatment of good faith in the application of these clauses. 
III. PROPOSAL OF A UNIFORM STANDARD FOR DETERMINING WHEN A 
LENDER ACTS IN BAD FAITH IN THE USE OF AN INSECURITY CLAUSE 
There should be a uniform standard established by courts to determine 
if a lender has breached an implied duty of good faith when ordering a re-
appraisal of collateral, applying an insecurity clause, and ultimately, calling 
a loan or foreclosing. The various state court jurisdictions should adopt this 
type of standard to protect borrowers from lenders that exercise their discre-
tion in bad faith. If a borrower has not violated any material covenants of 
the loan and the appraised value of the collateral is greater than the out-
standing balance currently due on the loan, then the courts should find that a 
lender has breached an implied duty of good faith if it uses an insecurity 
clause in this scenario, without other compelling evidence. 
A. Proposed Standard in Its Entirety 
Assuming that the borrower has not violated any material covenants of 
the loan and the appraised value of the collateral is higher than the remain-
ing balance due on the loan, the lender should not be able to take advantage 
of the insecurity clause without other evidence of insecurity. Despite the 
decrease in the appraised value of the property, if a lender can still recover 
the outstanding balance due on the loan from the borrower's payment and 
203. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: MORTGAGES (\997); see also Grant S. 
Nelson & Dale A. Whitman, Reforming Foreclosure: The Uniform Nonjudicial Foreclosure 
Act, 53 DUKE L.J. 1399, 1407 (2004). 
204. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: MORTGAGES § 8.1 (1997). 
205. See id. 
206. Nelson & Whitman, supra note 203, at 1409. 
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collateral, then the lender is not insecure. 207 Under these circumstances, a 
lender should be deemed to have acted in bad faith if it executes an insecuri-
ty clause. The lender is not insecure-it still has two avenues of collection 
for its loan: the regular payments from the borrower and the collaterat2°8 
Because an appraisal is ultimately just an estimate of a property's val-
ue, a lender should not be allowed to use solely this valuation to call a loan 
when the borrower has done nothing else to suggest that future payments 
will not be made. 209 There are times when regulators require banks to reap-
praise their collateral, and it could be during this process that a lender dis-
covers that a particular property has significantly decreased in value, sug-
gesting insecurity.210 However, if the lender chooses to have a property re-
appraised when regulation does not require it to, then it may be an arbitrary 
choice by the lender. There may be some instances where a lender would be 
justified in obtaining a reappraisal, but an overall downturn in the real estate 
market should not be justification for a lender to target a specific property 
for reevaluation.211 If a lender is genuinely concerned that the value of its 
collateral is no longer an adequate secondary source of repayment, then the 
lender should have the property reappraised. However, frequently this genu-
ine concern is not the only motivation. Rather than having only a concern 
that a specific property has decreased in value to a level that is impairing 
their loans, lenders are using the poor market conditions as an excuse to 
accelerate loans and gain liquidity in order to deal with their own prob-
lems.212 Lenders should not be able to take advantage of responsible bor-
rowers who are making their payments just because the overall market has 
declined or is struggling.213 The courts must introduce a standard for deter-
mining when lenders are acting in bad faith by implementing an insecurity 
clause. Therefore, courts should adopt the following two-prong analysis to 
determine a breach of the implied duty of good faith by lenders implement-
ing insecurity clauses in commercial mortgages. 
1. The Borrower Has Not Violated a Material Covenant of the Loan 
If the borrower has not violated a material covenant of the loan, then 
the lender must be able to show other evidence to prove that it is insecure. 
207. See discussion supra Section I.A. 
208. See supra note 7. 
209. See discussion supra Subsection I.C.1. 
210. See discussion supra Subsection I.C.2. 
211. See discussion supra Section I.A. Perhaps if a borrower made a substantial struc-
tural change to the secured property or if there was a fire that damaged the property, then the 
lender may be justified in having the property reappraised to see if the value of the property 
was sufficient to act as a secondary avenue of recovery. 
212. See discussion supra Part I. 
213. See discussion supra Section I.A. 
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Two major covenants in commercial mortgage agreements are that there is 
not a monetary default by the borrower and that the borrower has main-
tained the collateral in a condition consistent with the original loan terms. 214 
If the borrower violates one of these covenants, or another similar covenant, 
then that could be enough to suggest that the lender is in good faith inse-
cure. 
To avoid a monetary default, the borrower must make regular timely 
payments towards the loan, as agreed to in the terms of the loan.215 Although 
collateral secures a comrriercial mortgage, the primary avenue of collection 
for the lender remains the borrower's regular loan payments. If the borrower 
has been making payments as required and has always paid in the timeframe 
outlined in the agreement, then the lender generally would have no reason to 
feel insecure. The lender should have to show some other reason why it 
feels insecure. The primary purpose of an insecurity clause is to protect the 
lender in instances when it believes it will not be able to recover all the 
money due on the loan.216 If the borrower is paying the lender as arranged, 
then the lender is receiving what it is entitled to. 
It is possible that the borrower could be making payments and the 
lender could still feel insecure. If the borrower has been making consistently 
late payments, then these late payments could give the lender a good faith 
reason to believe that it is insecure and may not receive future payments.217 
Tardiness could suggest to the lender that the borrower may be having diffi-
culty coming up with monthly payments, which could make the lender feel 
insecure about repayment in the future. In addition, if the lender has been 
making payments, but the lender knows that the borrower has not been pay-
ing any of its other bills or has overdrawn its bank account, then this may 
suggest insecurity to the lender. 
If the borrower has taken steps to maintain the collateral as required 
by the loan agreement, then the courts should take this maintenance into 
consideration when determining the lender's insecurity. All collateral is 
subject to normal wear and tear, but this deterioration does not necessarily 
mean the value of the collateral has significantly decreased.218 In the original 
loan agreement, the lender bargained for the collateral to be of a particular 
quality, based on the appraisal at the origination of the loan. If the borrower 
has maintained the condition of the collateral, then the collateral likely still 
214. For other examples, see What to Expect When Applying for a Commercial Mort-
gage Loan: Banks and Private Alternatives, REALESTATEABC.COM, http://www.realestateabc. 
com/loanguide/applying-commercial2.htm (last visited Apr. 19, 2012). 
215. See supra note 4. 
216. See discussion supra Section I.A. 
217. For a similar example, see BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY, supra note I, at 866 
(stating that a creditor can demand payment if"the debtor suddenly loses a significant source 
of income"). 
218. See supra note 5. 
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exists at the bargained for quality. This situation is different from a situation 
where there is a decrease in the appraised value.219 If the collateral exists in 
the same condition as the original loan agreement required, then the lender 
should have to show more evidence than just a decrease in appraised value 
to show insecurity. 
If the real estate market is stable but a particular property has deterio-
rated because ofthe borrower's inaction, then this deterioration may suggest 
insecurity. At all times during the loan agreement,_ the collateral is supposed 
to act as a second avenue of recovery if needed. 220 The deterioration of the 
collateral could affect the lender's ability to be made whole if the lender 
needed to foreclose on the property to recover. 
2. The Value of the Collateral, Although Reduced from the Original 
Value of the Loan, is Greater Than the Outstanding Balance Due 
on the Loan 
When determining if a lender breached an implied duty of good faith 
in its application of an insecurity clause, courts should consider whether the 
appraised value of the collateral is greater than the outstanding balance due 
on the loan. This relationship between the appraised value and the outstand-
ing balance due should be taken into consideration because of the extremely 
subjective nature of appraisals:221 There are a number of factors that go into 
a typical appraisal, such as market area, neighborhood, size, and improve-
ments.222 In the current market, there are less sales going on, so it is difficult 
for appraisers to find comparable properties to use in their estimation of the 
property's value.223 In addition, it is difficult to find accurate appraisah; in 
today's market because many of the sales that are being made are often dis-
tressed sales. 224 These factors can greatly affect an appraisal and should be 
considered when determining a lender's insecurity.225 
Courts should assess whether, at its current appraised value, the collat-
eral can still adequately serve as a second avenue of recovery for the lender 
if the borrower stops making payments. 226 If the appraised value of the 
property is greater than the outstanding balance due on the loan, then the 
lender should not be able to claim insecurity based solely on the appraised 
value because the collateral would make the lender whole. If the borrower 
219. See discussion supra Section I. C. 
220. See supra notes 6, 7 and accompanying text. 
221. See discussion supra Subsection I.C.l. 
222. See discussion supra Subsection I.C.l. 
223. Billingsley, supra note 13, at 4; see also Examining the Continuing Crisis, supra 
note 88, at 169 (explaining that there are less sales). 
224. See Examining the Continuing Crisis, supra note 88, at 169. 
225. See discussion supra Subsection I. C. I. 
226. See supra notes 6, 7 and accompanying text. 
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stops making payments, the lender would still be able to recover the money 
it is due by foreclosing on the secured property and selling it. 221 Courts 
should consider, on a case-by-case basis, whether there is a reasonable pro-
spect that the lender would be made whole by the foreclosure of the collat-
eral. If so, the court should find that the lender has breached its implied duty 
to use the clause in good faith. 
Many markets in the United States have been hit very hard by the cur-
rent commercial real estate downtum.228 However, there are companies in 
these areas that are still profitable and are not struggling to make their loan 
payments.229 Because of the overall downturn in their areas, it is possible 
that the appraised values of their properties have decreased despite their 
continued success. 230 It is important to protect the loans of these borrowers 
who are facing decreased property values because of the overall market, but 
who are still capable of making their loan payments.231 By considering 
whether the property value is greater than the outstanding loan balance, the 
courts would create a compromise between lenders wanting to guarantee 
repayment and borrowers whose properties have decreased in value only 
because of the surrounding market. If collateral is reappraised at a lower 
value than it was originally appraised for, but the lender will still be made 
whole by foreclosure of the property, then the lender should not be consid-
ered insecure based on this decrease in value alone. 
If a borrower's outstanding loan balance is $50,000, and the real estate 
market in that area is declining, then the lender may choose to have its col-
lateral reappraised. If the collateral was originally valued at $200,000, the 
same amount as the original mortgage, and is reappraised at $100,000, then 
the lender may try to argue that it is insecure. In reality, the collateral is 
more than sufficient security to protect the lender's interest because the val-
ue of the collateral exceeds the outstanding loan balance. Therefore, the 
decrease in the appraised value alone should not be enough to show that the 
lender is insecure. 
When determining if the value of collateral is greater than the balance 
outstanding on the loan, the courts should take into consideration expenses 
that will be required to dispose of the collateral and the likelihood that the 
value will continue to decline. If a property has decreased in value, the 
227. See supra note 7. 
228. See discussion supra Part I. 
229. See supra note 3. 
230. See supra note 3. 
231. "The congressmen are ca\ling for the agencies to make clear public statements 
encouraging lenders to continue to make credit available for performing assets, even if the 
value of the property has taken a hit in its value." Cyrus Sanati, Congress Worries About 
Commercial Real Estate, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. I, 2010, http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/ 
02/0 I /congress-worries-about-commercial-real-estate/?scp= I &sq=commercial%20foreclos 
ure&st=cse. 
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lender may still reasonably feel insecure if property values are still signifi-
cantly decreasing or if the property will be very expensive to dispose of. For 
example, if the value has decreased to $100,000, but it will cost $75,000 to 
dispose of the property, then the lender would be insecure because the fore-
closure would not make the lender whole. 
Although these factors deserve consideration when determining 
whether a lender breached a duty of good faith in its use of an insecurity 
clause, it is important to remember that an appraisal is at best an educated 
guess of a property's value, and lenders should not be permitted to use an 
appraisal estimate offensively to trigger an insecurity clause.232 Where the 
lender's basis for insecurity is the appraised collateral value, the borrower 
should be able to rebut this value. Courts should recognize that, as a market 
declines, appraisals become more of an estimate and less of a comparison of 
similar properties.233 If the current value of the collateral is greater than the 
outstanding balance due on a loan, then the court should require the lender 
to show other evidence of insecurity. 
B. Applying the Proposed Standard in Today's Market 
In areas where the economic downturn has greatly affected the com-
- munity, many borrowers have maintained profitable businesses and have 
made their payments as stipulated by their loan agreements. 234 If the basis 
for the lender's insecurity claim is a decrease in the appraised value, the 
courts should limit this claim by a duty to act in good faith. If the borrower 
has done nothing to suggest that it is insecure, it should not be forced to pay 
the full amount of the loan earlier than arranged. In many instances, the 
borrower is following the same practices it was doing during the prior re-
payment period under the loan. It has not changed its behavior to suggest an 
inability to pay, yet it is being treated as if, suddenly, it will be unable to 
pay. Although the value of the collateral has decreased, the court should 
evaluate whether there is actually a concern that the lender will not be able 
to fully recover under the agreement. 235 
The lender should not be able to use the appraisal process to create a 
default in a situation where the overall market has significantly decreased~236 
In such a total market meltdown, when there has not otherwise been a de-
fault in the loan and the appraised value is still greater than the outstanding 
balance due on the loan, using an insecurity clause based on an appraised 
valuation would not seem to be what the parties bargained for when they 
232. See discussion supra Subsection I.C.l. 
233. See discussion supra Subsection I. C.!. 
234. See supra note 3. 
235. See discussion supra Section I.A. 
236. See discussion supra Section I.A. 
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included the insecurity clause in their agreement.237 The insecurity clause 
allows the lender to protect itself from nonpayment.238 Using this clause to 
accelerate the loan for any reason other than the risk of non-payment should 
be considered a breach of the duty of good faith. 239 The lender cannot use 
the clause to get something that it gave up in negotiations.240 The lender 
made the loan for a period of time and should not be able to accelerate pay-
ment simply because the market has taken a tum for the worse.241 
If the borrower has not violated any material covenants of the loan 
agreement, then the lender should have to show more than simply a de-
crease in appraised value in order to justify insecurity. There are instances 
where all of these conditions are met, but the court could still find that the 
lender did not act in bad faith. However, in these instances, the lender 
would have to show something beyond simply a decrease in appraised val-
ue. For example, if the lender knew that the borrower, although making its 
monthly loan payments, was not paying its other bills, this could suggest 
that the borrower may eventually have difficulty paying the lender as well. 
Or, if the business was losing money, this loss may suggest that in the future 
the borrower would be unable to make its loan payments. Another example 
would be if the borrower had overdrawn its bank account. These types of 
situations may provide enough support for a lender to show that it is inse-
cure. However, if the borrower has not violated any material covenants in 
the loan agreement and the lender cannot show any reasons for its insecurity 
beyond the decrease in appraised value, then the court should hold that the 
lender breached its implied duty to act in good faith. 
CONCLUSION 
An implied duty of good faith should limit the application of insecuri-
ty clauses in commercial mortgages. Although insecurity clauses play an 
important role in protecting lenders, this protection should not be without 
boundaries. Establishing standards by which courts could evaluate lenders' 
actions to determine if they acted in bad faith when applying an insecurity 
clause would allow lenders to have the benefits of these clauses, while also 
protecting borrowers. There needs to be a balance between the two compet-
ing objectives. 
When an overall market has downtumed significantly, a lender should 
have to prove its insecurity by showing more than a decrease in the value of 
collateral. Courts should evaluate whether a borrower has violated any cov-
237. See discussion supra Section I. B. 
238. See discussion supra Section I.A. 
239. See discussion supra Section I. B. 
240. See discussion supra Section I. B. 
241. See discussion supra Section I. B. 
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enants in the loan agreement and whether the current value of the secured 
property is greater than the outstanding balance due on the loan. If the bor-
rower has not broken any material covenants in the loan and the appraised 
value of the collateral is greater than the outstanding balance of the loan, 
then the court should require the lender to show other evidence of its insecu-
rity. If the lender cannot, then the court should hold that the lender breached 
an implied duty of good faith when it implemented the insecurity clause. 
This standard would alleviate many of the problems associated with insecu-
rity clauses implemented during an economic downturn. 
